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Environment in Sudan at a Glance
2014-02-02 00:00:00

Environment in Sudan at a Glance

Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign paid attention to the environmental issues at all levels locally, regionally and internationally such serious consideration reflected in the establishment of specialized Department for the environmental affair. The challenges of the environment and its impacts are serious, and increasingly complex.Sudan believes that the environmental issues should be treated through concerted efforts of the international community to save our planet and ensure benefits for current and future generations.A new concept has emerged linking closely the climate change impacts and the ،...

     Rural Woman Empowerment and her Role in Poverty Reduction  Promotion and Present Challenge
2014-02-03 00:00:00

Rural Woman Empowerment and her Role in Poverty Reduction Promotion and Present Challenge

Background: Sudan  enjoys  a  strategic  location  in  the  center  of  the  African  continent.  It  shares geographical Location with seven countries of North, East, West and central Africa with total land area of 1,882,000 million km square  (250 million hectare). Current  estimates  put  the  population  at  excess  of  30,419,625  million  (North  Sudan)  , female 14.796  million  with  annual  growth  rate  estimated  at ،...

Women Empowerment   Policy
2014-02-03 00:00:00

Women Empowerment Policy

Introducti          In the context of the aspirations of the Sudan, in light of current processes of  transformation  currently  underway  in the  Sudan,  and  in consideration  the  significant  contribution  to  the  social  and  economic development  of  the  Sudan  by  Sudanese  women  in  recent  decades; there is a better understanding of the concept of empowering women within  a  framework  of  realizing ،...

Two Areas
2014-02-04 00:00:00

Two Areas

   A Tale of Two States The Agreement on South Kordofan and Blue Nile States and the Path of Implementation and the Recent Security DevelopmentsThis paper aims to clarify and illustrate the situation of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, from its inclusion in the agreement up to the current situation. We have summarized the agreement in the points below. The entire agreement is published and available for those who wish to obtain further details. Important points in the Agreement- Negotiations with the SPLM covered the two states, although th،...

2014-02-05 00:00:00


Protocol between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A on the Resolution of Abyei ConflictAbyei Area Referendum ACT 2009How the Abyei experts exceeded their mandate Arbitration Agreement between The Government of Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Delimiting Abyei Area Agreement Of Temporary Arrangements For Administration And Security Of The Abyie Area.Agreement Between The Government of Sudan And The UN Concerning The Status of The UNISFA . AUHIP Proposals Towards a Resolution of The Issue of AbyeiAUHIP TFA Proposal Final Sudan Legal Note 27.12 LASTThe Republic of Sudan ،...

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Two Areas

  • Two Areas


    • A Tale of Two States
      The Agreement on South Kordofan and Blue Nile States and the Path of Implementation and the Recent Security DevelopmentsThis paper aims to clarify and illustrate the situation of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, from its inclusion in the agreement up to the current situation. We have summarized the agreement in the points below. The entire agreement is published and available for those who wish to obtain further details. Important points in the Agreement- Negotiations with the SPLM covered the two states, although they were geographically outside the south, which is the subject of negotiations by the Declaration of Principles (DoP), in recognition of the fact that a considerable percentage of Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement recruits are originally from the two states and the SPLM has maintained actual presence there since the 1980s, which is a fact that cannot be overlooked.- The Agreement on the states included all aspects of security and political power-sharing as well as the social and economic aspects including wealth -sharing. In the framework of a decentralized (federal) system additional powers were allocated (authorities schedule) for the two states as well as additional resources, especially in areas affected by war in the north.- Participation of SPLA forces in the joint units in the states in preparation of their integration or decommissioning after the end of the CPA and the determination of the final status of the South.- Giving the SPLA forces in the two states a good time for redeployment, demobilization and reintegration in conjunction with the redeployment of the armed forces from south to north.- It was stated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that the Agreement represents a model for any peaceful political settlement in other areas of Sudan with specific demands and that need special development programs.
    • Political Participation (Before Elections)
      It was agreed during the transitional period before the general election , which was five years, to ensure the political participation of the SPLM despite the fact that the (45%) of power-sharing was not proportional to the actual existence of the movement in the two states where the SPLM was confined to less than 10% of the two states’ area, but there was a genuine desire to establish peace for the benefit of citizens and reassure leaders of the movement to and motivate them to seek to establish peace and participate in efforts aimed at solving citizens’ problems. The agreement was concluded and carried out during the specified period as follows- The governor and deputy governor alternately in the two states.- 45% of the Legislative Council’s seats in each state were allocated for the SPLM .- Participation also included filling the posts of commissioners as well as local councils. Redeployment Observations on the behaviour of the SPLM and its position against the early implementation of the agreement were detected early.- The SPLM declared to the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Commission higher numbers of its forces more than its true figure in the two regions (59,000) to allow itself to recruit new forces during the transitional period, and demand larger amounts of money than it needs for the process of demobilization and reintegration (DDR).- The SPLM consistently brought weapons to regions including heavy weaponry (e.g., the plane that landed in Kurmuk carried weapons as witnessed by the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Commission.).- The SPLM continued to receive aircrafts in the states without following the required procedures and acquiring the necessary clearance from the sovereign powers of the National Civil Aviation at the airfields in Kaudah and Kurmuk in the states.- The redeployment of SPLA forces in accordance with the peace agreement did not exceed 38% as stated in the report of the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Mission, led by the United Nations. Liberated TerritoriesIn accordance with CPA, the SPLM entered towns and villages of the two states in military manifestations and continued during the transition period to deal with the mentality of “liberated territories”, so it did not open areas that were controlled by it before the signing of the peace agreement to the state’s sovereign institutions despite the full participation of the movement in leading the legislative and executive institutions in the two states. On the other hand, the movement continued to exercise leadership in the legislative and executive institutions in the two states. Moreover, it restricted the movement of citizens and set up checkpoints to collect fees and taxes .
    • Absorption in the Security Apparatus, Police and the Civil Service
      Despite of the clear evil intent and violation of the terms of the security arrangements agreement and despite the fact that the movement’s of forces did not complete the redeployment and demobilization, a number of SPLA forces in the two states were absorbed in security, police and civil service. The armed forces and police and security services declared that they are fully prepared to absorb qualified SPLA forces in the two states as (a privilege not a right). (See the report by the evaluation commission). Political Elections and PartnershipGeneral elections were held in 2010 with a wide participation from international monitoring bodies. It resulted in the following-- The SPLM won the governor post in the Blue Nile and (18) seats in the Legislative Council from a total number of 54 seats.- Continuation of the partnership at the level of the government and the Legislative Council.- Elections in South Kordofan were delayed because the SPLM objected to the population census in the state. Despite the high cost, it was decided to repeat the process again, thus delaying the elections in the state of South Kordofan.
    • Popular Consultation
      The popular consultation is a right of citizens of the two states stipulated in the agreement and it is a program that seeks to find how best to administer the two states and provide services to citizens and to regulate relations between local levels of government. The government considered it as a specific approach to strengthen and develop the federal system of government and its success could lead for application in the rest of the states of Sudan.- The Legislative Council of Blue Nile State formed a parliamentary committee, in accordance to the agreement, which began its work to conduct the popular consultation.- Opinions of citizens were taken through popular conferences held in all parts of the state under the supervision of both parties and the participation of local and international monitors.- The outcome of taking the opinion of citizens was monitored by national and international organizations including (Carter Center) .- It was supposed to start taking the opinion of (the elite), which was not completed because the SPLM worked to disrupt the process as it was not satisfied with the indications of the results of taking the opinion of citizens.- The popular consultation in the state of South Kordofan did not start as it was subject to the convening of the recently-elected legislative council (the state’s parliament) which was formed after the election in mid 2011 and convened on 18 th/ September 2011. The elected council wassupposed to form a supervising parliamentary committee to oversee the consultation process according to the agreement.- After the rebellion by the governor the popular consultation will continue the results of which will be implemented because the process is the right granted to the citizens of the state and a not privilege for the SPLM.
    • The Return to War after the Elections in South Kordofan
      - The slogan of the SPLM in the election was (the star or an attack), the star refers to the SPLM’S logo and the attack refers to enforcing SPLM control by military force, which is a precondition for its victory or violent rejection of the results.- The National Congress announced before elections that its Program of partnership with the SPLM will continue regardless of the election results (even if the SPLM loses).- The National Congress won the governor’s office (201.455 votes) with 6.500 votes. The SPLM candidates in the election were o Abdul-Aziz Al-Hilo who was deputy governor and head of the SPLM in the state won 194.150 votes. o Talafon Koko (an SPLM military leader now detained in Juba) won 9.150 votes.- The National Congress announced its commitment to its program based on establishment of stability, development and enhancing of political and social peace and invited the SPLM to share power.- The SPLM Won (21) seats in the Legislative Council from a total of 54 seats.- The SPLM disrupted the final assembly of the results for a period of time when initial results showed the National Congress ahead of the SPLM. Guarantors of the peace agreement intervened to complete the final count of votes which confirmed the loss of the SPLM, largely because of internal divisions inside the movement.- After the final results the SPLM demanded the continuation of political partnership regardless of the election’s results with a 50% share.- The National Congress agreed in principle on political partnership and made reservations regarding the percentage as it contested the elections as part of a broad coalition and these parties should have a share in the proposed government a matter that will affect both the share of the National Congress and the SPLM.- On 6 / June / 2011 and while the elected governor was heading back from airport after bidding farewell to the SPLM delegation led by Malik Aggar and Yasser Arman, his motorcade was attacked and at the same time the SPLM forces attacked Kadugli from all sides in a coordinated move aimed at taking over the state.- The SPLM carried out several assassinations in the cities of the state particularly Kadugli and Diling where civil society leaders were targeted as well as Imams of mosques, head and members of popular service committees and senior civil service employees.
    • Return to War in Blue Nile State
      - The remainder of the SPLM in the North announced after South Sudan became an independent state that its troops fall under the command of SPLA in south Sudan and the flag hoisted by it in South Kordofan and used by the governor-elect of the Blue Nile remained the same as the flag of south Sudan, as well as the slogan of armed militias affiliated to it.- The SPLM in the Blue Nile State, led by (Malik Aggar) who is at the same time Chairman of the SPLM in the north of Sudan, joined forces with the SPLM in South Kordofan and formed a joint military command led by Aggar .- Abdul Aziz Al-Hilo, who lost the elections in South Kordofan and is the leader of insurgency there, was quoted as announcing that “we are fighting in the war of the peripheries against the center and will strive to change the regime in Khartoum by force”.- The SPLM executed a plan to spread fear and instability in the state through targeting civilians in repeated attacks (villages, herdsmen and suburban areas) as well as police stations, completely avoiding government army sites.- In preparation for the resumption of war the SPLM in the Blue Nile state began to withdraw its political and military leadership and their families from Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile State, including Aggar-- On 1/9/2011 the SPLM began its major assault on a number of areas in the Blue Nile state including the capital Damazin with a view to taking the whole state in a surprise attack.
    • Coalition to overthrow the regime
      The SPLM organized the Kaudah conference on 7/ August 2011 which came out with a declaration of a military and political coalition to overthrow the government by military force in what it called (war of the periphery against the center), including the Darfur armed movements opposed to the Doha document besides the SPLM. Then they formed the so-called (Sudan Revolution Front ) .
    • Refusal to register a political party
      The remainder of the SPLM refused the government call to register as a new political party as northern citizens and gave them the choice to keep the party’s name or change it according to the country’s constitution (2005) and the law of political parties (2007